backfires. The fundamental health policy dilemmas are unsolvable; policy makers are faced with a trade-off between equity and cost control that cannot be resolved with any finality, only balanced in either direction.
The study of health policy reform is likely to benefit from concentrating on both actors and outcomes, in particular, focusing on "feedback loops from policy outcomes." (p18), 3 Success in achieving cost control can lead to demands for new reforms. An example of this is the study made done by Helderman, Schut, van der Grinten, van de Ven 5 where they argue that discontent with long waiting lists in the Netherlands strengthened the alliance in favor of regulated competition. By focusing on a long time span , we demonstrate that reforms in the Norwegian hospital sector can be seen as reflecting a pendulum that alternates between increases in activity and strengthening of cost control. There are several other approaches built on analyzes of actors and outcome that will supplement our approach, for example the understanding of veto players that can block changes. 6, 7 We commence with a short description of methods before digging into a historical review of Norwegian health policy.
| METHODS
This is a case study of major health care reforms in Norway in the period from 1970 to 2014.
We rely on expenditure data for descriptive purposes. Data on total health expenditure were taken from Statistics
Norway. Data on actual and planned activity growth were taken from annual reports on hospital economy from SAMDATA. Reports from 2009 to 2014 can be found at the Directorate for Health's website: https:// helsedirektoratet.no/statistikk-og-analyse/samdata. Earlier reports can be found here http://www.sintef.no/ Projectweb/Startsiden/.
For this article, we have updated activity data used in an earlier study, 2 but the main data sources are qualitative and consist of policy documents. We use quotes from newspaper articles for illustrative purposes.
| RESULTS
We identified 4 different phases from 1980 to 2014: two phases during which activity growth was at the forefront of the agenda and 2 phases during which cost control was the most important goal.
| Cost control: 1980 to 1996
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Norwegian health policy makers became increasingly aware of the need for cost containment. To some extent, this reflected a general shift across different countries. Developments such as the energy crisis and conservatives coming to power changed the focus in health policy from expansion to cost control.
This shift may also be seen as a response to the expansive politics of the post-World War II era. 8 In 1980, Norway followed many other countries and introduced a block grant system. The expansion of the health care sector started to take its toll financially, 8 and as a consequence, policy makers emphasized more control over expenses. The introduction of a block grant system effectively placed the risk for variations in costs and activity on the provider (Figure 1 ), which stalled the growth in health expenditure in Norway and improved cost control significantly. The flipside, however, was that waiting times increased. Controlling costs came at the cost of reduced growth in activity, increased waiting times, and dissatisfaction among voters and users.
The first attempts to handle the increase in waiting times involved regulative measures, and most importantly, a legal waiting time guarantee was implemented in 1990. According to this legislation, county councils were to assume full responsibility for offering treatment within 6 months to patients who had been given the guarantee, and available capacity in other counties was to be used when needed. However, this strategy proved unsuccessful. The guarantee was introduced in 1990, and the minister of health at the time, Wenche Frogn Sellaeg, viewed it as legally binding on e68the counties. 9 The counties did not appear to share this view and argued that the lack of resources made it impossible to fulfil this guarantee imposed by the state. In effect, the guarantee was a political guarantee made by national politicians, and it was the responsibility of the county politicians to follow up on this guarantee.
Regulation could not solve the problem of the increased waiting times. The move towards block grant financing in 1980 appeared to solve the cost control problem, but it also created a problem with waiting lists. Solving the problem of waiting lists meant changing the financing system once again.
| Activity increase: 1997 to 2005
Activity-based financing (ABF) was implemented in the Norwegian hospital sector from 1 July 1997. A fraction of the block grant from the state to the county councils was replaced by a matching grant that depended on the number and composition of hospital treatments. Variations in demand and costs were adjusted through the block grant, and the remaining activity-based component was based on national average costs per diagnosis-related group (DRG). At first, 30% of the DRG-based cost of a treatment was refunded by the state. This percentage was increased to 40% from 1 January 1998, and to 50% from 1 January 1999. 10 The introduction of ABF places the risk for uncontrolled variation in activity and, therefore, also costs back with the central government, but only partially. Consequently, hospitals (regional health authorities or RHAs) whose activity exceeds the agreed-upon level will not be fully reimbursed. Furthermore, because the price is based on national averages, providers that do not use the resources efficiently are also punished. The combined model can be seen as an attempt to balance the need to increase activity with the need to control costs. Since 1998, the share of ABF has varied between 40% and 60%.
The motivation for introducing DRGs varies between different countries 11 The main argument for introducing DRGs depends on the type of health care system. For example, in the United States, DRGs were introduced to improve cost control, whereas the main goal of the United Kingdom's National Health Service was to improve productivity. 11 In general, the use of DRGs seems to be related to lower health expenditures, 12 although in the Norwegian case, the lack of clear budget setting by the state combined with incentives to increase activity has led to higher expenditures. Theoretically, this may be interpreted as showing the effects of changes in the way risk is shared between the state and the hospitals. Clearly, understanding the changes in financing is important for understanding the changes in costs and activity in this period. But the changes also coincide with changes in political will. Introducing a block grant system provides hospitals with incentives to improve cost control, but it also an effect of a change in political focus. By making hospital income partially based on activity, the state was able to reduce waiting lists, but controlling costs soon became a problem again. Although waiting times were reduced, control over the costs in the sector was also reduced, primarily because of the greater incentive to increase activity under a partial ABF system. In the block grant period, the state was able to create hard budget constraints. This ability weakened during the 1990s, and the introduction of ABF was the final blow to budget setting. 13 The shift to a partial ABF system in 1997 encouraged increases in activity. However, the ABF component did not cover the marginal costs of increasing the activity. The ABF component varied between 40% and 60%, and the remainder of the costs had to be covered through the block grant, which was independent of activity. It soon became apparent that there was a growing mismatch between the expected level of activity (set by the state) and the actual activity levels in the hospital sector. Similar to the other financing models used, ABF solved some problems while creating others. In this case, the increased activity created deficits at the county level, and a "blame game" developed between the counties and the state. In this period, the state was unable to create hard budgetary constraints, and the counties had good reason to expect a bailout if their costs exceeded the budget. Soft budgetary constraints became a major problem during this period.
2 This is the background into which the hospital reform of 2002 was introduced. The major change was that the counties were stripped of the ownership of the country's hospitals, and the state took over. The central government's role was strengthened, and local politicians were removed from the decision-making processes locally and regionally.
The expectation was that, when both ownership and the responsibility for financing were placed with the state, budgetary discipline would improve.
Two changes were of particular importance in the reform. First, the central government took over hospital ownership, and second, 5 RHAs were formed and were given the responsibility for managing hospitals and hospital services in their region. The RHAs soon faced important choices. They had to decide how to organize their relationship with the hospitals within their catchment area. They also had to decide whether the hospitals should be an The RHAs could then identify those hospitals that performed best based selected criteria reward them with contracts.
On the other hand, choosing the traditional model with larger (horizontally) integrated hospitals meant that coordination and scale benefits would be prioritized before competition. In 2002, the largest public sector reform ever undertaken in Norway occurred when the central government took over ownership of the hospitals. One of the key motivations behind the reform was to control costs by mending the fiscal imbalance caused by the separation of the responsibility for production and financing between the counties and the state. The attempt was unsuccessful. The introduction of ABF in 1997 had created strong incentives to increase activity; however, the activity-based component based on DRGs did not cover the marginal costs of increasing activity. Consequently, increased activity also meant increased costs and deficits. In the years that followed, the central government takeover; the deficits in the sector were even higher than during the period when the counties owned the hospitals. 2 Like the attempt to use waiting time guarantees in the 1990s, balancing the inherent trade-off between cost control and activity growth using instruments outside the financing system did not work.
The problem was more political than organizational. The minority situation in parliament created a situation with soft budgetary constraints. 2 Because of the minority situation in parliament, the RHAs had valid reasons to expect a bailout when in need. The shift to a majority cabinet in 2005 hardened the budgetary constraints. The central e70government now had both the will and the ability to be credible. The first health minister in the new Stoltenberg cabinet sent a clear signal to the RHAs.
One of the reasons we are in this situation is that one has spent more money than one has. This has to stop! ... She says that the days when hospitals were allocated more money after being unable to stick to their budgets are gone, and characterizes it as undemocratic to demand more money than what the elected
representatives in parliament already has appropriated. 15 The center of power had shifted from parliament to the cabinet, and the signals sent by the minister were credible. Figure 2 shows that the change in wording coincided with a significant change in budgetary discipline. There was a discrepancy between the planned growth (from the national budget) and the actual growth in activity. In the first period, the actual activity was far higher than what the central government wanted, which created deficits. In the years following 2005, the situation changed dramatically so that growth was actually lower than what had been planned in some years.
Clearly, the RHAs now listened, and consequently, the growth in expenditure decreased ( Figure 3 ) and bailouts were no longer necessary. In the period from 1980 to 1997, cost control was achieved through formal changes in the financing system.
Although the Stoltenberg cabinet did not change the financing system, the same basic mechanism was effective between 2005 and 2014. Establishing a hard budgetary constraint is, in effect, a matter of allocating risk. Put differently, soft budgetary constraints arise because the provider or agency does not have to bear the risks associated with poor budgetary discipline. The central government achieved this through the use of hierarchical steering mechanisms and not through formal changes in the financing system. Because activity above a predefined level was not tolerated and a strict hierarchal regime of monitoring the RHAs, and the activity level was created, the RHAs were effectively operating within a block grant system. Hierarchical steering was made possible because the new cabinet was a majority cabinet. In the years of minority rule, other ministers attempted to reduce the activity growth but were unable to do so because of the minority situation. 
| Activity increase II: 2014 to ?
On 7 October, 2013, the Conservative and the Progress parties presented their political platform. Under the title "Health Policy," they stated
It is a challenge that many patient have to wait for an unnecessarily long time to receive necessary treatment, also for health services for which private healthcare providers have available capacity. In order to reduce waiting times and healthcare queues, the Government will pursue all viable avenues in
the effort to treat patients.
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The intentions here were clear. Waiting lists were to be reduced, and this was to be achieved through an increased use of private providers. Patients were now to be given the opportunity to choose freely among private and public providers where possible, and the cap of reimbursement for private providers was to be removed.
Increased use of private providers is a recurrent theme in Norwegian health policy. The conservative Syse cabinet (1989) (1990) wanted to increase the use of private providers to reduce waiting lists, as did other Conservative politicians. The Social Democratic Party, however, has remained sceptical about the use of private providers. This skepticism has been alleviated somewhat in the past decade or so, and private providers are used more now than in the 1980s and 1990s.
Both the problem and the solution proposed by the Solberg cabinet were not new. However, transforming intention into policy turned out to be difficult. The proposal was criticized by a wide array of actors. It was feared that removing the cap for private providers would lead to escalating costs and less equal access to health care. Private providers operate under contracts with RHAs, which in turn are partially financed through a block grant. Removing the cap for private providers would increase the price for this activity, which would have to be paid by the RHAs. This could lead to escalating costs and could potentially affect how different patient groups are prioritized.
tendency toward pendulum swings or circularity in health care reforms. The reforms have alternated between pursuing cost control and attempting to solve problems related to waiting lists that arise because of the pursuit of cost control. In this way, the effects of previous decisions become important explanatory variables for current decisions. system have not changed dramatically in the period after World War II. Most importantly, the focus on equality and access remain as fundamental to Norwegian health policy today as it was 50 years ago, and there is a clear reluctance to undertake major reforms that may affect these goals.
This reluctance to implement major changes could be related to the growth in gross domestic product (GDP).
Norwegian economic development based on the income from petroleum activity in the North Sea has been formidable since the 1990s. In addition to affecting the perceived need for reform, this economic boom may be an important driver of the shift between cost control and activity growth that we have described here. The most important predictor of spending on health care is GDP; consequently, the large growth in GDP in Norway during this period may make
Norway the odd one out internationally. One could argue that this makes the Norwegian case a special case for studying the effect of high GDP growth on cost containment policies. If so, the question arises as to what, if any, lessons can be learned from the Norwegian case.
We believe that there are several. First, the policy processes described can be characterized as pendulum swings or circular. They do not follow a linear path but instead comprise attempts to alter and adapt to problems that arise because of earlier decisions. In this respect, our conclusion is similar to that of Toth 19 insofar as the circularity of health care reform is concerned. However, our argument and case clearly illustrate the need to focus on countrybased internal processes and not on international reform trends or other exogenous variables. More importantly, we believe that the cyclic nature of health care reform illustrated here shows important features of health politics in universal health care systems. Cost control is unpopular and may undermine fundamental values relating to equity and access. Pursuing cost control comes at a political cost, and increasing activity creates political benefits. This is one of the main causes of the cyclic nature of health care policy described in this article. However, the general financial situation does constitute an intermediate variable.
Second, understanding how policies of cost containment and/or activity increase the cost of a national health care system usually requires an understanding of how the financial system allocates risk between the central government and the main providers of health care. 20 In the periods analyzed here, the financial system reallocated risk several times. The effects of these changes on both cost containment and activity increases have been remarkable.
In particular, the introduction of global budgets around 1980 and the introduction of activity limits in 2005 placed greater risk on the providers and eased the pressure on the central government. However, changes in financing systems are not independent of changes in political preferences. A move to a block grant system will affect cost control, but at the same time, such a change can reflect a stronger focus on cost control. Consequently, it may be difficult to separate the independent effects.
Third, a policy or reform can be implemented to achieve different goals, and there is not necessarily a one-to-one match between policy solutions and problems. The motivation for introducing DRGs may vary between different health care systems based on fundamental features of the health care system "type." 11 While the introduction of DRGs in the United States was motivated by a need for increased hierarchical cost control, this was not the case in Germany or in the United Kingdom. In the Norwegian case as well, DRGs were introduced as a tool for activity increase not cost control. 21 Our main conclusion is that policy makers are faced with a dilemma that cannot be resolved with finality but can only be balanced in one direction at any given time. Although single reforms or reform trends over a shorter time span can be described as trends or "waves," 19 in the long run, health policy reflects a pendulum that swings between cost control and activity growth. One could argue that Norwegian policy makers have had the opportunity to focus on activity growth after periods of activity decline (cost control) because of the general financial situation. However, cost control is no less important as a policy driver in Norway than in other countries. Achieving cost control is also politically difficult in other countries where the financial situation is less favorable. We therefore believe that the features described in this article reflect a fundamental feature of universal health care systems. Health politics involve trying to maximize different goals that are impossible to maximize simultaneously. Pursuing both equity and quality comes at a high economic cost. Reducing and controlling economic costs gives rise to political costs because of the increased waiting times and public dissatisfaction. The empirical consequence of this dilemma, at least in the Norwegian case, is a pendulum that swings back and forth between cost control and activity growth.
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